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DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST REVISITED
Richard A. Posner*
A book as interesting and important as John Hart Ely's study of
constitutional law, Democracy and Distrust, requires the perspec-
tive of time for a proper evaluation. When published in 1980 it
seemed another in a spate of books and articles about constitutional
law written by liberals nostalgic for the days when Chief Justice War-
ren (to whom the book is dedicated) led a like-minded group of Jus-
tices in remaking that law; and I confess that, not being a liberal in
the relevant sense, I read the book less carefully than I should have
done.I Reread ten years later, the book stands forth as a work of
outstanding merit but also as an exemplar of deep problems both in
constitutional law and in the academic study of law generally.
The book is best known for proposing a unifying principle for
understanding and extending the program of the Warren Court, but
that is the project of the last three chapters of the book. The first
three chapters constitute a critical monograph of independent signifi-
cance. Their aim is twofold: to affirm the necessity for tethering con-
stitutional law-in the sense of the body of principles actually applied
by judges-to the Constitution's text and history, against those who
would make constitutional law a vehicle for enforcing "fundamental
values" discovered by judges as an exercise in moral philosophy; but
at the same time to knock down the interpretive approach variously
called "strict construction," "textualism," and "originalism," but
which Ely calls "clause-bound interpretivism."2 As Ely shows con-
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School. This essay was prepared for the Virginia Law Review's
symposium marking the tenth anniversary of John Hart Ely's book, Democracy and Distrust:
A Theory of Judicial Review (1980). Page references to Ely's book appear in the text of this
essay. I thank Frank Easterbrook, Lawrence Lessig, and Cass Sunstein for their very helpful
comments on a previous draft.
I With the result that I failed to make proper attribution to Ely of some of the criticisms of
judicial activism and restraint that I made in chapter 5 of The Federal Courts: Crisis and
Reform (1985), and chapter 7 of The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990).
2 The "fundamental values" school is the target of Ely's wittiest sallies. "The Constitution
may follow the flag, but is it really supposed to keep up with the New York Review of Books?"
(p. 58). "[Wle may grant until we're blue in the face that legislatures aren't wholly democratic,
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vincingly with the aid of an uncommonly lucid and unaffected prose
style, the "fundamental values" approach gives judges too much dis-
cretion, and "clause-bound interpretivism" too little; the middle way
is a moderate interpretivism.
Ely's book has helped me to see, though in the teeth of his own
intentions, that there is no middle way. Rather, there are these two
ways that he stresses (of course there are countless others as well) in
which judges can go wrong. The first way, what he calls the "funda-
mental values" approach, is by being too willing to make political
judgments (in favor of women, of freedom of contract, of blacks, of
fetuses, of labor unions; against criminals, big businessmen, Commu-
nists-whatever); the second is by not being willing enough, so that
substantive injustices are ratified, even reveled in, in the name of the
rule of law. The first mistake invites charges that the judges are being
lawless, the second that they are being legalistic. Alternatively-a
way of putting the matter that is particularly apt when the subject is
constitutional law and the challenge is to legitimate the practice of
declaring statutes unconstitutional-the first mistake invites charges
that the judges are elitist, antidemocratic, arrogant in setting their
judgment against that of the people's representatives; the second, that
they are too quick to yield to populist pressures, too insensitive to the
danger of tyranny by the majority, too pious and credulous about the
ideology of democracy. You can if you want call the avoidance of
these extremes "interpretivism." The objection is that by doing so
you imply the existence of a technique that, if only judges would
adhere to it, would prevent them from going to either extreme. If
there is such a technique, no one has discovered it.
Not Ely, in any event. The second half of the book is his proposal
for a moderate interpretive approach to constitutional law. What he
does or at least purports to do is to search for values that can fairly be
said to be "in" the Constitution and that judges are equipped by expe-
rience and by the nature of their office to promote. What he finds,
reading the text of the Constitution in light of what its framers said
but that isn't going to make courts more democratic than legislatures." (p. 67). "The notion
that the genuine values of the people can most reliably be discerned by a nondemocratic elite is
sometimes referred to in the literature as 'the Fiihrer principle[ ]' ...." (p. 68). Robert Bork
could not have said it better-making his criticisms of Democracy and Distrust a little
ungenerous. See R. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 194-
99 (1990).
[Vol. 77:641
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about it in the Federalist Papers and elsewhere, is that the document's
basic purpose-also that of the amendments from the Bill of Rights to
the present-is to create a system of government in which elected rep-
resentatives will do a sincere and competent job of representing the
interests of all the people. Representative government presupposes
two values, both of which are procedural in a broad sense. They are
participation and representation-participation by all competent
adults in the election of government officials, and fair representation
of all by those officials. Judicial decisions that promote these values
not only are lawful because they are consistent with the spirit of the
document being interpreted; they also cannot be criticized as
antidemocratic because the values they promote are quintessentially
democratic ones.
So Ely has done more than find in the Constitution the very values
whose vigorous deployment by the Supreme Court in the heyday of
Earl Warren's chiefjusticeship called down upon the Court charges of
elitism; any defender of the Warren era could do that, working imagi-
natively upon the plastic material for interpretation that an ancient
document provides. Ely's trick is to argue that the Court, far from
acting in elitist fashion with or without the permission as it were
of the framers, was making America more democratic by promoting
the foundational democratic principles of participation and
representation.
Participation was promoted, for example, by judicial decisions that
required apportionment on the basis of "one man, one vote," that out-
lawed poll taxes, that limited the power of states to discriminate
against nonresidents (who because they are such have no political
voice in the state), and that protected freedom of political advocacy
and association. Representation was promoted by identifying minor-
ity groups whose interests were unlikely to be weighed sympatheti-
cally by representatives drawn primarily from the majority, and by
forbidding government to place unequal burdens on such groups
without a compelling and noninvidious reason for doing so. Discrimi-
nation against aliens illustrates both forms of democratic failure
against which Ely's program is directed. Aliens have no voting
power; and legislators-citizens all-lack the sort of firsthand experi-
ence with aliens that would enable them to empathize with their
problems and needs.
1991]
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Ely is ingenious in relating the clauses of the Constitution (includ-
ing the amendments) to the values of participation and representation.
He points out, for example, that the commerce clause, in its "nega-
tive" or "dormant" aspect, limits the power of a state to shift the costs
of government to residents of other states by means of a tax on a
scarce commodity produced within the state but consumed mainly
elsewhere. Similarly, the free exercise clause of the first amendment
has been used for the most part to protect marginal, despised sects,
such as Jehovah's Witnesses; the protections that the Bill of Rights
extends to criminal defendants ensure a form of representation for the
denizens of the despised and poorly understood social margin from
which most criminals come. At times, it is true, Ely's analysis is cir-
cular. The negative commerce clause, for example, is a free (some
believe an unsound) judicial interpretation of the textual commerce
clause, so one cannot use that text to argue that Ely's approach is
immanent in the Constitution. On the other hand, a number of con-
stitutional provisions, such as the equal protection clause, the privi-
leges and immunities clause, the fifteenth amendment, the other
voting rights amendments, and the republican form of government
clause, fit his model without strain. Of course, he is treating as an
integrated whole a set of documents written in different centuries, and
of course it is an embarrassment to his project that nowhere in this
palimpsest can be found the conferral of a right to vote tout court.
But these are not decisive objections. They merely underscore the
uncertainty of constitutional interpretation.
The body of constitutional law that Ely's approach generates bears,
as one would expect from the book's dedication, a general resem-
blance to the constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren era. But
there are interesting differences not all of which are merely extrapola-
tions from that jurisprudence to the problems of the 1970's. Here are
the ones Ely emphasizes:
1. Women, being an electoral majority, are entitled to no special
constitutional solicitude. By the same token, however, laws discrimi-
nating against women that were enacted before they got the vote are
unconstitutional-but if those laws are reenacted after being found
unconstitutional, then they are acceptable.
2. Affirmative action is unproblematic since it is a matter of
whites discriminating against themselves. Obviously whites are ade-
644 [Vol. 77:641
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quately empathetic toward the problems of fellow whites adversely
affected by policies that favor blacks.
3. There is no constitutional right to privacy. The "privacy" deci-
sions (really decisions about the sexual and reproductive freedom of
women), culminating in Roe v. Wade,3 have no relation to a "partici-
pation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial
review" (p. 87). There is no other "interpretivist" basis for them
either since they are the product of "fundamental rights" jurispru-
dence, nothing more.
4. In apparent tension with point three, discrimination against
homosexuals is suspect because legislators are unlikely to empathize
with their problems and concerns. But if satisfied that the laws
criminalizing homosexual behavior are founded on "a sincerely held
moral objection to the act (or anything else that transcends a simple
desire to injure the parties involved)" (p. 256 n.92), judges should
uphold the laws, unembarrassed by any claim that homosexuals have
a right to sexual freedom because Ely believes that no one has a con-
stitutional right to sexual freedom. Aliens are even more clearly enti-
tled to judicial solicitude than homosexuals since they do not even
have a right to vote.
5. It is strongly arguable that capital punishment is unconstitu-
tional because murderers from the affluent, educated class that sup-
plies our representatives, judges, and other public officials are never
executed.
6. There is a constitutional right of travel, specifically a right to
move to another state without the penalty imposed, for example, by a
durational residency requirement in order to qualify for welfare bene-
fits. The recognition of this right serves to add "exit" to "voice" as a
mode of participation in the political process.
The foregoing list does not, of course, exhaust the content of consti-
tutional law according to Ely. He recognizes that some provisions of
the Constitution confer substantive rights wholly unrelated to partici-
pation or representation, and naturally he endorses the participation-
oriented and representation-reinforcing decisions and doctrines of the
Warren and Burger eras, such as the reapportionment, poll tax, and
political speech decisions. The propositions in my list are, however,
the distinctive product of his theory, his interpretive middle way.
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1991]
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Ely's argument is ingenious, elegant, and plausible. But is it con-
vincing? It is true that the framers, both of the original Constitution
and of most of the amendments, were concerned about problems of
representative government. It is also true that two of the problems in
this realm are lack of participation and lack of effective representa-
tion. But, to begin with, these really are one problem, not two. If
some people are not effectively represented because they are not
allowed to vote or because their candidates are put in jail for espous-
ing their interests; or if they are not represented on equal terms
because their vote is weighted less heavily in the election than other
people's; or if they are not represented because their nominal repre-
sentatives do not understand or care about their problems and their
needs, as a consequence of the fact they are importantly different sorts
of people from the representatives (they are aliens or blacks or homo-
sexuals or whatever), then, in all of these cases, there is a defect in
representation.
But the defect is found in a number of other cases as well, cases that
Ely does not discuss. There is the matter of interest group politics,
whereby a compact group will often be able to use the political pro-
cess to transfer wealth to itself from a larger, more diffuse group-
consumers or taxpayers, for example-whose members are, as a prac-
tical matter, helpless to protect themselves against this mulcting. So
the fact that women are an electoral majority does not guarantee that
the political process will reflect their preferences. A large and amor-
phous majority may be at the mercy of the very sort of interest group
that Ely conceives it to be the fundamental purpose of the Constitu-
tion to protect. There is (a related point) the electorate's pervasive
ignorance of, and substantial indifference to, the effects of public poli-
cies. There is also the fact that representatives are not perfect agents
of the electors; they have their own interests, selfish and otherwise.
And there is the fact that, except in states that have referenda or ini-
tiatives, we vote for people rather than for policies-which means
that, at best, we are voting for a package of policies-and it is easy to
show that particular policies may end up being adopted that are not
the preference of a majority of the voters.
No doubt most of the problems of representation are beyond the
practical reach of judicial correction. But if they are left unsolved, it
is by no means clear that the judicial initiatives that Ely commends
will improve the functioning of representative government, or even
646 [Vol. 77:641
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that those he opposes will not improve it. Take, to illustrate the first
point, affirmative action. Forget the fact that there are cities in which
blacks are an electoral majority. Concede, as I am certainly prepared
to do, that, notwithstanding "white guilt," white legislators do not
ignore the costs of affirmative action to whites. It does not follow that
affirmative action passes Ely's representation test. Affirmative action
programs give a boost to a traditionally disfavored minority, such as
blacks. The boost might take the form of an award of super-seniority
or of extra points on a civil service exam, or a lowering of the test
score required for admission to a prestigious school. Who is hurt by
such thumb-on-the-scale tactics? The marginal white-the white who
would have been the first to be rehired in the event of layoffs, the last
to be hired, or the last to be admitted to the school. Is it realistic to
assume that his plight is uppermost in the thinking of the upper-mid-
dle class legislators or educators who adopt affirmative action pro-
grams? And shall we exclude the possibility of coalitions between
blacks and whites to advance some blacks at the expense of some
whites for selfish political reasons, unrelated to social justice?
Consider now Griswold v. Connecticut,4 the Connecticut contracep-
tive case, first of the sexual autonomy cases. Had it, as Ely believes,
nothing to do with representation? Was it not a case about the power
of an interest group, consisting of the Catholic Church and devout
Catholics, to block legislative reform that would have benefitted lower
class and lower-middle class girls and women primarily-a diffuse
group, not all of voting age, with a weak political voice-whose access
to family planning services was severely impeded by the Connecticut
statute?5 In discussing legislation discriminating against women that
was passed before they got the vote and has not yet been repealed, Ely
4 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5 See Comment, The History and Future of the Legal Battle over Birth Control, 49 Cornell
L.Q. 275, 287-91 (1964) (discussing the development and application of the law in
Connecticut). Robert Bork has argued that the law-a ban on the use of contraceptives-was
not enforced. R. Bork, supra note 2, at 95-96. It is true that the statute was enforced only
against birth control clinics-all of which closed down after Connecticut's highest court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute in State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856
(1940), not to reopen until the Supreme Court of the United States struck down the statute in
Griswold. (All this was discussed extensively in the briefs and oral argument in Griswold,
which can be found in 61 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Constitutional Law 3-453 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975).) Birth control
clinics cater primarily to persons of low income. L. Gordon, Woman's Body, Woman's Right:
A Social History of Birth Control in America 288-89 (1974); N. Himes, Medical History of
1991] 647
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displays sensitivity to the inertial character of the political process;
but it was inertia that prevented Connecticut from repealing its
archaic ban on contraception.
Consider now apportionment. At first glance it might seem that
there could be no more palpable affront to the principles of represen-
tative government than to make the votes of people from one part of a
state count for more than the votes of people from another part. But
on reflection it becomes apparent that people rarely have the same
voting power. There are more senators per capita in Delaware than in
New York; so each Delaware voter has more voting power in United
States Senate elections than each New York voter. I live in a congres-
sional district in which Republicans have no voting power so far as
the election of a representative is concerned because there are too few
Republicans in the district to induce the Republican Party to put up a
plausible candidate. Voting power is, moreover, only one element of
political power; others include money, education, age, membership in
or good access to a constitutionally privileged class, such as the press,
and membership in a politically effective interest group. So various is
the allocation of political power wholly apart from whether state leg-
islatures are malapportioned that it is impossible to predict whether
reapportionment will have any systematic impact on policy outcomes.
And there is, in fact, little evidence that it has had any such impact.6
The weaknesses in Ely's analysis that these examples expose are at
once internal to his argument (the "malapportioned" character of the
United States Senate suggests that the Constitution embodies a differ-
ent democratic theory from the one Ely would impose on the states in
the name of the Constitution) and illustrative of a weak sense of fact
(for example in his discussion of Griswold). They are also weak-
nesses at the level of political and social theory. Almost the only
political scientist whom Ely cites is Robert Dahl, who did his major
work in the 1950's. Ely cites none of the economic literature on inter-
est groups, though there'was already an abundant and accessible liter-
ature when he wrote his book.8 He cites none of the public choice
Contraception 357 (1936) ("American birth control clinics serve primarily the working
classes").
6 R. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 151 n.44.
7 See J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 67, 219 n.118 (1980).
8 See, e.g., G. Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation (1975); Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 335 (1974).
[Vol. 77:641
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literature, which is closely related and even earlier.9 He cites Gordon
Allport and other psychologists on the nature of prejudice to bolster
his contention that we may have trouble empathizing with persons of
a different race or religion or social class or sexual preference. This is
true, but neither the psychologists nor Ely presents evidence that fail-
ures of empathy are common in the political arena. Whatever their
considerable other failings, politicians might be thought specialists in
discerning the interests of their constituents.
So the book is not a masterpiece of social science; but so what? Ely
is engaged in interpretation, isn't he? Do you need social science to
interpret the Constitution? Ely calls his approach interpretive, and it
is that, at least in the sense of being connected, by however long a
chain, to a document. The Constitution created a representative form
of government. Ely believes that by correcting some defects of repre-
sentation, judges could make government even more representative
than it is. The almost embarrassing plenitude of vague constitutional
provisions gives judges ample power to carry out this program. They
can do, in fact, anything-abolish capital punishment, force the states
to allow homosexual marriage, force them to extend the franchise to
nonresidents and maybe even to aliens-all in the name of the Consti-
tution's participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing theme.
They could, I have suggested, though Ely demurs, bring the sexual
privacy cases, some of them anyway (and not just ones brought by
homosexuals), under that umbrella.
If this is interpretation-and I do not doubt that it is-then what
exactly is "noninterpretivism" or "fundamental rights" jurispru-
dence? You need a handle in the constitutional text to be able to say
that you are interpreting-but liberty, surely, could do as well in that
role as representation-and then you are off and running. It is true
that if you run from the liberty side of the field you run into the argu-
ment that the courts are elitist. There is more open ground on the
representation side. Fine. But to run well, you need more social sci-
ence than Ely deploys in Democracy and Distrust. It is true that Ely
might be seen as finessing this point, despite the citations to Dahl and
Allport, inasmuch as one reason he prefers the theme of representa-
9 Famous examples are J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962); M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action:
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965).
1991] 649
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tion to that of liberty is that he thinks lawyers and judges better
equipped to deal with questions of process than with questions of sub-
stance. This would be correct if Ely were speaking at the level of
trials and hearings. But he is speaking of the design of political insti-
tutions. About this level of governmental process, lawyers and judges
know as much or as little as they know about our society's fundamen-
tal values. The effects of apportionment, the political dynamics of
affirmative action, the conditions for effective minority politics, the
significance of conflicting interests within a group (housewives and
working women, for example, have sharply different economic inter-
ests), the force of inertia in the political process-these and other mat-
ters central to the construction and evaluation of a participation-
oriented representation-reinforcing jurisprudence are issues in social
science. They are not issues of "process" rather than "substance" in
any sense relevant to the capacities of the legal and judicial profes-
sions. Ely has imposed a specific and highly contestable political the-
ory on the long dead framers.
So, in the end, one is not convinced by Ely, though impressed by his
ambition and panache. The reasons for his (magnificent) failure have
ultimately to do with the nature of constitutional law and of the aca-
demic study of law. The Constitution is an old document drafted by
men who, despite much civic piety to the contrary, were not clairvoy-
ant. Two centuries of amendments have created a confusing palimp-
sest. A document that as a result is inscrutable with respect to most
modem problems has been overlaid by hundreds of thousands of
pages of judicial interpretation, much of it internally inconsistent.
The sum total of all this documentation is not a directive, but a
resource, and further interpretive ventures, therefore, whether that of
Ely or that of his opponents to the left and right, are bound to illus-
trate interpretation as creation, not as constraint. You will not be
able to choose among these interpretations on semantic or conceptual
grounds. You will have to choose on the basis of which seems best, in
a sense that includes but also transcends considerations of fidelity to a
text and a tradition, making the interpretive question ultimately a
political, economic, or social one to which social science may have
more to contribute than law.
At least this is the case when law is treated in so provincial a fash-
ion as is the accepted mode even at the best of our law schools. How
absurd it is that constitutional law should be considered a single spe-
[Vol. 77:641
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cialty, so that a John Ely is presumed to be able to speak knowledge-
ably about the social treatment of aliens and of ilegitimate children,
of homosexuals and of women, of political agitators, of religious dis-
senters, and of murderers on death row. Academic law is "clause-
bound" in its own way. Because government programs dealing with
aliens, illegitimates, members of racial minorities, indigent criminal
defendants, non-veterans, and women are all challenged and litigated
under one tiny clause of the Constitution-the equal protection
clause-it is natural to think that one person should be able to evalu-
ate all those programs, together with laws and policies affecting
fetuses, homosexuals, and others whose rights are litigated under the
adjacent due process clause; natural, but wrong. The programs are
heterogeneous and their social consequences complex.
The truth is that constitutional lawyers know little about their real
subject matter-a complex of political, social, and economic ques-
tions. What they know is a body of decisions written by other poorly
informed lawyers. Nowadays most judicial decisions, even those in
the Supreme Court, are written by law clerks a year or two away from
graduation. What professors of constitutional law teach and study is,
to an extent I should think they would find embarrassing, the work of
their recently graduated students. It is not a sustaining diet.
This means that Ely wrote his book under considerable handicaps.
In these circumstances, if it must as I believe ultimately be judged a
failure, it is not only an exemplary but a heroic one. And it is a fail-
ure only in its constructive ambitions. As a work of criticism it is a
triumphant success. We should not be surprised. The lawyer's power
of destructive analysis is his greatest gift.
1991]
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